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Rubin: Corporate Law: Misappropriation Theory of Liability Upheld for Ru

CASE COMMENT
CORPORATE LAW: MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY OF
LIABILITY UPHELD FOR RULE 1OB-5
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997)*
Stefan Rubin*
Respondent was charged with fifty-seven counts of mail fraud,
securities fraud, fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer, and
money laundering.! The securities fraud charges were based on section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder. As a partner in a law firm, Respondent

*
Editor's Note: This Case Comment won the George W. Milam Outstanding Case
Comment Award for the Spring 1997 semester.
** This Case Comment is dedicated to my wonderful parents, without whose love and
support this never would have been possible.
1. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1997).
2. See id. at 2205. Section 10(b) provides in relevant part:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Under power granted by
Congress in § 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5, which provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .... or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
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learned that one of his firm's clients was proposing a tender offer' to
acquire a company.4 Although Respondent did not work directly with
the client, he learned of nonpublic information regarding the acquisition.' News of the acquisition had not yet been released to the public
when Respondent began purchasing call options 6 and common stock in
the proposed target company.7 After the acquisition was announced to
the public,8 Respondent liquidated his securities for a profit of $4.3
million.9 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated an
investigation and charged Respondent with securities fraud under a
misappropriation theory of liability.'
At trial, Respondent was convicted on all counts." On appeal to the
Eighth Circuit, Respondent contested that the misappropriation theory
was an impermissible theory of liability under both section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and SEC Rule 10b5.12 Accepting this argument, 13 the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's opinion. 4 After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court reversed and HELD, the misappropriation theory is a valid theory

3. A tender offer is "a form of acquisition in which the acquiring corporation goes
directly to the shareholders of the target corporation and asks them to 'tender' their shares in
exchange for whatever the acquiring corporation is willing to offer." LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET
AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ORGANZaONS 821 (4th ed. 1997).
4. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2205.
5. See SEC v. O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1461, 1463 (D.Minn. 1995), rev'd sub nom.,
United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997).
6. A call option is a financial instrument which provides its owner the right to purchase
a specific number of shares of stock at a set price within a specified time period. After the time
period ends, the option expires and the owner may no longer exercise the right to purchase
shares. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 613, 614 n.1 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
2199 (1997).
7. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2205. When the tender offer was publicly announced,
Respondent already owned 2500 unexpired options (each representing the right to purchase 100
shares) and 5000 shares of common stock of the target company. See id.
8. Several courts have found that the announcement of the target company's identity in
a proposed tender offer usually causes that company's stock price to increase. See, e.g., SEC v.
Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 628 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that "[w]hen a tender offer is announced,
usually the price of the target company rises and the price of the offeror falls or remains the
same'); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that "even a hint of an
upcoming tender offer may send the price of the target company's stock soaring").
9. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2205. When the tender offer was announced, the stock
price of the target company rose approximately 50%, from $39 per share to nearly $60 per
share. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 615.
13. See id. at 622.
14. See id at 628.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss2/5

2

Rubin: Corporate Law: Misappropriation Theory of Liability Upheld for Ru
CASE COMMENT

of liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule lOb515

The primary purpose of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to promote
market integrity and investor confidence. 16 Section 10(b) prohibits
using any manipulative or deceptive device, or violating any SEC rule
promulgated in furtherance of section 10(b), "in connection with" a
securities transaction.1 7 Under powers granted by Congress to promote
section 10(b), the SEC enacted Rule lOb-5 to further protect the
integrity of the market.1 8 Similarly, Rule lOb-5 prohibits committing
any "fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security."19 Rule lOb-5 violations give rise to both civil
and criminal liability,2 and the misappropriation theory of Rule lOb-5
liability has been supported in both the criminal and civil enforcement
actions. 21
Traditionally, only insiders of the target company in a proposed
tender offer could be charged with Rule 10b-5 violations. 22 Gradually,
the SEC also began to charge outsiders with Rule lOb-5 violations.23

15. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2213-14.

16. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210; Brief of
Amicus Curiae Association for Investment Management and Research in Support of Petitioner
at 3-10, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (No. 96-842) [hereinafter AIMR
Brief]. The stability of our financial market is premised on the notion that all investors begin
on equal footing. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2210. While complete parity of information is
impossible, "investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading
based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law." See id.
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); supra note 2.
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (authorizing the SEC to enact rules "for the protection
of investors").
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c); supra note 2.
20. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u, 78ff (1997); see also O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2206 (stating that
"criminal liability under § 10(b) may be predicated on the misappropriation theory"); United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that "section 10(b) was written as
both a regulatory and criminal piece of legislation"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
21. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2206; see also Materia, 745 F.2d at 201 (upholding
injunction and penalty in SEC enforcement action for violations of Rule lOb-5 under the
misappropriation theory); Newman, 664 F.2d at 16, 19 (explaining that a Rule lOb-5 criminal
prosecution can be based upon a misappropriation theory of liability).
22. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (stating that an affirmative
duty to disclose nonpublic information before trading on it has traditionally been imposed on
corporate insiders such as officers, directors, and majority shareholders); see also General Time
Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that "[w]e know of no
rule of law... that a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary relation
to a prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal" nonpublic information regarding the
securities transaction).
23. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d
197 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
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One of the earliest decisions addressing Rule lOb-5 liability for outsiders
of the target company was Chiarella v. United States.' In that case,
the defendant worked for a financial printer.25 While at work, he
deduced from partially blank documents the identities of the target
companies of several proposed tender offers.26 On the basis of this
nonpublic information, he purchased stock in the target companies. 27
The SEC charged the defendant with violating section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 by purchasing securities in the target companies without disclosing the nonpublic information.2 ' The district court convicted the
defendant on all counts and the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.21
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant did not
commit the fraud necessary to violate Rule l0b-52 0 The Court
reasoned that the defendant's nondisclosure of the nonpublic information
could only constitute a fraud if the defendant first had a duty or
obligation to disclose the information. 31 The Court held that only
insiders and fiduciaries of the target company owed such a duty to the
company and its stockholders. 32 Because the defendant was neither an
insider nor a fiduciary of the target company, he did not owe a duty to
the company or its stockholders.33 The Court further reasoned that it
could only affirm the defendant's conviction if it recognized a broad
duty among all market participants to either disclose or abstain from

24. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
25. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 224.
26. See id. A company's stock price is sensitive to news of a proposed corporate takeover.
See Materia, 745 F.2d at 199. Therefore, the identities of the companies involved are usually
omitted from the preliminary drafts of the merger or acquisition documents until as late as
possible. See id.; see also Chiarella,445 U.S. at 224 (recognizing that the identities of the firms
are usually concealed until the final printing).
27. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 224.
28. See id. at 225.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 225, 232.
31. See id. at 228, 231.
32. See id at 229; see also Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911 (recognizing that
insiders with nonpublic information are under a duty to disclose the information before they
trade on it). This is known as the classical theory of Rule lob-5 liability. See O'Hagan, 117 S.
Ct. at 2207. The classical theory applies to both insiders, such as those who work directly for
the target company, and temporary insiders, such as accountants, lawyers, etc. who have a
fiduciary relationship with the target company. See id.; see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655
n.14 (1983) (noting that certain corporate outsiders, such as accountants and lawyers, may
become fiduciaries of a company if nonpublic corporate information is shared with them as a
result of their confidential relationship to the company).
33. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 231-33.
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trading on nonpublic information? 4 Based on the language and the
legislative history of section 10(b), however, the Court found no
evidence of such a broad duty among market participants.35 Under this
narrow interpretation of section 10(b), the defendant because he could
not be guilty of Rule lOb-5 fraud for not disclosing the information,36
did not have a duty to disclose the information to the company or its
stockholders.
The SEC alternatively argued that the defendant was guilty of
violating Rule lOb-5 because he misappropriated confidential information entrusted to his employer by the target company..37 Under this
theory of liability, the duty breached which constitutes the fraud is the
defendant's duty of confidentiality to his employer. 8 The Court
dismissed this argument and refused to assess the validity of this
theory because it was not originally submitted to the
misappropriation
39
jury.
However, Chief Justice Burger espoused an even larger misappropriation theory of Rule lOb-5 liability in his strongly-worded dissent to
Chiarella.4 According to Chief Justice Burger's broad interpretation
of Rule lOb-5, any person who fraudulently and unlawfully misappropriates nonpublic information owes a duty to all other market participants to either "disclose that information or to refrain from trading" on
it.4 1 By using his employer's nonpublic information for private,
personal gain, the defendant breached his duty of confidentiality to his
employer and thus owed an absolute duty to either disclose the
information or refrain from trading on it.42 Chief Justice Burger
believed that, under the misappropriation theory, the defendant was
guilty of violating Rule lOb-5 by not disclosing the nonpublic information.43 This marked the birth of the misappropriation theory of Rule
lOb-5 criminal liability.

34. See id. at 233. This bright line rule became known as the "disclose or refrain" rule.

35. See id.
36. See id. at 231.
37. See id. at 235.

38. See id. at 235-36.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 243-44 (Burger, C.L, dissenting).
41. Id. at 240 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger stated that he would read
the language of § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 as requiring that "a person who has misappropriated
nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from
trading." Id.

42. See id. at 240, 244 (Burger, C.., dissenting).
43. See id. at 245 (Burger, C.L, dissenting).
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After Chief Justice Burger introduced the misappropriation theory in
his dissent to Chiarella,the SEC took note and began basing Rule lOb-5
charges solely upon the misappropriation theory. 4 SEC v. Materia was
one of the first cases where the federal courts were forced to rule on the
validity of the misappropriation theory.45 In Materia, the Second
4
Circuit faced nearly the same factual situation as it had in Chiarella.1
The defendant worked for a financial printer and deduced the identities
of the target companies of several proposed acquisitions. 47 Based on
this information, he then purchased securities in the target companies
before the news was released to the public. 48 The SEC charged the
defendant with violating Rule lOb-5 under the misappropriation theory
of liability, claiming that he misappropriated his employer's information
by using it to purchase securities for personal, financial gain.49 Thus,
in this case the misappropriation theory of liability was properly
submitted for judicial consideration. 0
The district court held that the defendant had violated section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 5 ' and the Second Circuit affirmed, wholly embracing
the misappropriation theory as suggested in Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Chiarella.52 The court stated that the legislative history of
the Exchange Act indicated that section 10(b) "was intended to be broad
in scope."53 Under a broad interpretation of Rule lOb-5, any fraud in
connection with the trading of securities is enough to warrant Rule lOb5 liability. 4 In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent reversal of
Chiarella,the Second Circuit distinguished Materia on the sole ground
that, in Materia, the misappropriation theory was properly submitted for
consideration. 5 The court then pointed out that in Chiarella, the
Supreme Court intentionally left the validity of the misappropriation

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See, e.g., Materia,745 F.2d at 199-200; Newman, 664 F.2d at 15-16.
See Materia, 745 F.2d at 199-200.
See id. at 199.
See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 26.
See Materia, 745 F.2d at 199.

49. See id. at 199-200. The SEC brought an enforcement action, rather than criminal
charges, against the defendant. See id. The SEC sought a permanent injunction to prevent future
violations, as well as an order requiring that the defendant turn over all profits from illegal
trading to the SEC. See id.
50. Compare id. at 200 with supra text accompanying note 39.
51. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 200.
52. See iL at 203.

53. Id. at 201.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 203. The court explained that the misappropriation theory was not rejected
by the Supreme Court in Chiarella. See id The theory simply was not considered because it
had not been originally submitted to the jury. See id.
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theory to be decided at another time. 6 Although the Supreme Court
left this issue unresolved, 7 the Second Circuit upheld the district
8
court's judgment under this new misappropriation theory of liability.
However, other circuits have been reluctant to uphold the misappropriation theory of Rule lOb-5 liability.59 For instance, in United States
v. Bryan, the Fourth Circuit rejected the SEC's use of the misappropriation theory in Rule lOb-5 actions.60 In Bryan, the defendant was the
director of the West Virginia Lottery.6 When the lottery decided to
expand by offering video lottery terminals, it accepted bids from various
gaming companies. 62 The defendant then purchased stock in several of
the bidding companies and rigged the selection process to ensure that
one of the companies in which he owned stock would be awarded the
contract.63 Once the lottery selected a contractor, but before the news
was released to the public, the defendant purchased additional stock in
that company.64 The SEC charged the defendant with violating Rule
lOb-5 under the misappropriation theory of liability,6 claiming that he
misappropriated nonpublic information from his employer and then used
the information to purchase securities.' The district court convicted
him under the misappropriation theory.67
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory of
liability and reversed the defendant's conviction.68 In reaching this
conclusion, the court carefully construed the precise language of section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 69 It noted that because Rule lOb-5 was promulgated in furtherance of section 10(b), it cannot be construed any more
broadly than section 10(b). 70 Because section 10(b) uses the word

56. See id. (quoting Chiarella,445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 204.
59. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 622 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S.
Ct. 2199 (1997); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995), overruled by United
States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
60. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944.
61. See id. at 936.

62. See id. at 938.
63. See id. at 938-39.
64. See id. at 939.

65. See id. at 943.
66. See id. at 939.
67. See id. at 936, 939.

68. See id. at 944.
69. See id. at 945-46.
70. See id, at 949 n.15; see also O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2217 n.18 (noting that "Rule

10b-5 may proscribe only conduct that § 10(b) prohibits"); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
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"deception," any valid theory of liability under Rule lOb-5 must further
this deception requirement." The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the

misappropriation theory allows liability when nonpublic information is
misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty, without requiring any

actual deception.72 Because the misappropriation theory "does not even
require deception,"73 the court stated that the theory is broader than
section 10(b) and therefore cannot be a valid theory of Rule 10b-5
liability.7 4 This set the stage for the Supreme Court to reconcile the
conflicting views among the circuit courts.75
In the instant case, the Supreme Court upheld the misappropriation
theory as a valid theory of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b5.76 The instant Court held that the misappropriation theory satisfied
Rule lOb-5's requirement that the "deception" be "in connection with"
a securities transaction. 71 The Court found that the "deception" element
was satisfied because misappropriating an employer's information for
private, personal gain defrauds the employer who entrusted the
employee with confidential information.78 The Court found that the "in
connection with" element was satisfied because the Rule 10b-5 liability
arose only when the misappropriator actually traded on the nonpublic
information. 79 Thus, the fraud was not consummated until the decep-

U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (stating that the scope of SEC Rule lOb-5 "cannot exceed the power
granted the [SEC] by Congress under § 10(b)").
71. See Biyan, 58 F.3d at 946, 949.
72. See id2
73. Id.
74. See id.
at 944, 949.
75. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2206. The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have
upheld the misappropriation theory of Rule lOb-5 liability, while the Fourth and Eighth Circuits
have been reluctant to uphold the theory. See, e.g., SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995);
SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); SEC
v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
But see, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 2199
(1997); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), overruled by United States v.
O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997). Since Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the
Supreme Court has only considered the misappropriation theory one other time, in Carpenter
v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2206 n.4. In that case, the
Justices were evenly split on the issue of whether the securities fraud charges based upon the
misappropriation theory of liability should be upheld. See id
76. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2213-14.
77. See id. at 2208.
78. See id.
79. See id at 2209. It was not a violation for Respondent to possess the nonpublic
information. See id. The violation was consummated when he traded securities based upon the
nonpublic information. See id.
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tion and misappropriation were used to purchase or sell securities. °
Under this broad interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, almost
any fraud in connection with a securities transaction will satisfy the
fraud requirement."1 The fraud does not have to be against the company
or its stockholders.8 2
The instant Court also looked at the legislative history and policy
behind section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 3 It recognized that the Exchange
Act was designed "to insure honest securities markets and thereby
promote investor confidence."' 4 Because the misappropriation theory
protects the integrity of the market, by preventing outsiders from using
nonpublic information in connection with securities transactions, the
Court reasoned that the misappropriation theory lies within the broad
purview of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.8 5 Finally, the Court stated
that in promoting market integrity, "it makes scant sense to hold a
lawyer like O'Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm
representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law
firm representing the bidder. ' 8 6 Thus, the instant Court held that
section 10(b) was intended to be read broadly, allowing liability for any
fraud in connection with the trading of securities.8 7
Justice Scalia, in a brief dissent, focused purely on the principle of
lenity applied when interpreting criminal statutes.8 8 According to the
principle of lenity, when a court faces an ambiguous criminal statute, it
should interpret the statute so that the result is most favorable to the
defendant.8 9 Thus, Justice Scalia believed that the principle of lenity
should have guided the Court's statutory construction of section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 to be as narrow as possible. 9° Accordingly, Justice

80. See id.
81. See id. at 2209-10.

82. See iL
83. See id. at 2207-10.

84. See idL at 2210 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 60412 (1980)). The Court stated that "[a]lthough
informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to
venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information
is unchecked by law." See id See generally AIMR Brief, supra note 16.
85. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207-08.
86. Id. at 2210-11.
87. See id. at 2211.
88. See id at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because there
was obvious ambiguity in the interpretation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, as evidenced by the
dichotomy of results among the circuit courts, the principle of lenity should have guided the
Court in interpreting the criminal statute to be as narrow as possible and more favorable to the
defendant. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, FuNDAMENTALs OF CRIMINAL LAW 135 (2d ed. 1995).
89. See ROBINSON, supra note 88.
90. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Scalia narrowly read the language of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as
requiring that the "manipulation" or "deception" be of the other partr
to the securities transaction, and not just of any market participant.
Under this narrow interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the
misappropriation theory would be an invalid theory of liability.92
The instant decision affirms the misappropriation theory as a valid
theory of liability under Rule lOb-5. 93 Since the misappropriation
theory was first broached in Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella
over seventeen years ago, the federal circuit courts have struggled to
understand the kinds of actions that fall within the Rule lOb-5 prohibition under the theory. 94 The instant Court now has made clear that a
breach of any fiduciary duty in connection with the exchange of
securities violates Rule lOb-5. 95
The primary importance of the instant decision is that it expands
Rule lOb-5 liability to include corporate outsiders as well as insiders. 96
While the SEC still will have to prove that the outsider breached some
fiduciary duty, this should not pose a problem in most situations because
confidential information is usually only obtained by reason of a
fiduciary relationship. 97 Subjecting both insiders and outsiders to Rule
lOb-5 liability should substantially reduce securities trading based on
nonpublic information.98 This, in turn, should promote market integrity
and further the policy behind section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 99
Although the instant Court relied upon a broad interpretation of
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, it recognized that the misappropriation
theory of outsider liability currently upheld is still not as broad as Chief
Justice Burger's original theory set forth in his dissent in Chiarella.'0

91. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. See id at 2213-14.
94. See supra note 75.
95. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
96. See id. The misappropriation theory of Rule lOb-5 liability applies only to corporate
outsiders. See id Until now, some circuits have allowed Rule lob-5 liability under the
misappropriation theory while others have not. See supra note 75. In the circuits that failed to
recognize the misappropriation theory, outsiders could only be charged with Rule lob-5
violations if they were, in essence, temporary insiders or fiduciaries of the target company. See
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
97. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2219.
98. See id. at 2207-08.

99. See id.
100. See id at 2208 n.6. The Court noted that Chief Justice Burger "advanced a broader
reading of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5" where "the disclosure obligation.., ran to those with whom
the misappropriator trades." Id (citing Chiarella,445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
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Chief Justice Burger espoused an absolute duty to "disclose or refrain."'O° Under that view, the misappropriator simply cannot trade
securities while in possession of nonpublic information.' °2 The
misappropriator must refrain from trading until the information is
disclosed to the public. 10 3
However, the instant Court noted that under the theory currently
upheld, the misappropriator only has a duty to disclose his intent to
trade on the basis of the nonpublic information to the sources of the
information.104 Because the misappropriator only owes a fiduciary duty
to the sources of the information, the only possible Rule lOb-5 violation
is if the misappropriator breaches his fiduciary duty to disclose to those
sources.'0 5 Thus, in the instant case, Respondent had a duty to disclose
his intent to trade securities to both his firm and his firm's client.1' 6
If the misappropriator discloses his proposed trading to the sources of
the information, then he is not deceiving them and is not guilty of the
fraud necessary for Rule 10b-5 liability. The Court stressed, however, that disclosure only precludes the misappropriator from section 10(b)
If the misappropriator trades securities
and Rule lOb-5 liability.'
based upon the nonpublic information, even if he disclosed his intent to
trade, he9 still may be liable under state law for breach of a duty of
loyalty.'
Similarly, the Court recognized another inherent limitation of the
misappropriation theory currently upheld.' 0 If the source of the
information authorizes the misappropriator to trade on the nonpublic
information, then the misappropriator is not defrauding the source and
will not satisfy Rule lOb-5's fraud requirement."' For instance, in the
instant case, if the Respondent's firm and its client specifically authorized all employees to use the nonpublic information for trading
purposes, then the Respondent would not be guilty of violating Rule

101.
102.
103.
104.

See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
See id. at 243-45 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
See iai (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208 n.6 (noting that "the disclosure obligation runs to

the source of the information").
105. See id.
106. See id.

107. See U at 2209. The Court stressed that "[dieception through nondisclosure is central
to the [misappropriation] theory.. . ." kl at 2208. Therefore, disclosure precludes liability under
the theory because there cannot be deception if the information is first disclosed. See id at 2209.
108. See id. at 2209.

109. See id.
110. See id. at 2211 n.9.
111. See id.
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lOb-5.1 2 If the Respondent were allowed to use the information, then
he would not be deceiving or defrauding the sources of the information
3
by using the information in connection with securities transactions.1
Although the misappropriation theory is designed to prevent outsiders
from trading on nonpublic information," 4 it does not fully achieve this
goal. 1 5 Under the current misappropriation theory, the misappropriator
must breach some fiduciary duty to the source of the information in
order to be liable under Rule lOb-5. 1 6 However, if the
misappropriator does not owe any fiduciary duty to the source of the
nonpublic information, then the misappropriator cannot be guilty under
the misappropriation theory of Rule 10b-5 liability." 7 For instance,
suppose a waiter overhears two corporate directors secretly discussing
their company's recent oil discovery during dinner and then, based on
this information, purchases securities in the company."1 Under current
law, the waiter, an outsider, will not be guilty of violating the misappropriation theory because he does not owe a fiduciary duty to either the
two directors or to the restaurant." 9 The outsider can legally buy or
sell securities in the company. 20 This permissible investment is clearly
contrary to the market integrity purposes behind section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.'
Another critical downfall of the instant decision was suggested by
Justice Scalia's dissent.12 Specifically, the instant case involves the
criminal application of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 2 1 In holding that
the misappropriation theory is valid under Rule lOb-5, the Court relied
on a broad construction of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.l 24 This
approach is contrary to the judicial system's usual approach towards
interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes. 2 While the subjective merits
of the misappropriation theory may be argued in the alternative, the

112. See id.
113. See id. However, when dealing with tender offers, principals who authorize such
trading may then be liable themselves under other sections of the Exchange Act. See id.
114. See id. at 2207.
115. See Thomas Lee Hazen, "Insider Trading" Under Rule 10b-5, in AMERICAN LAW
INsTrTUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 377, 382 (1997).

116. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id.
See Hazen, supra note 115.
See id.
See id.
See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
See id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id at 2206.
See id at 2210.

125. See ROBINSON, supra note 88.
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objective statutory construction procedures should not have been
overlooked.1 26 In the instant case, because the misappropriation theory
is being applied in a criminal context, Rule lOb-5 should have been
construed as narrowly as possible, requiring that the requisite fraud
element be met only by a breach of a duty to the other party of the
securities
transaction, and not just a breach of any fiduciary duty at
12 7
all.
Although the instant decision is clearly a victory for the SEC, it is
by no means a panacea to the market integrity problem created by
investors trading on nonpublic information. Even though the misappropriation theory protects market integrity, there still will be situations
where outsiders will be able to use nonpublic information in connection
with securities transactions.1 28 Furthermore, there will never be a
complete parity of information among market participants.' 29 As long
as this is true, investing in the market will continue to be riskier than
the drafters of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 intended.

126. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia explains
that the majority's interpretation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "does not seem to accord with the
principle of lenity we apply to criminal statutes .... "Id.
128. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
129. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210. The Court recognized that "informational disparity
is inevitable in the securities markets." IU See generally AIMR Brief, supra note 16.
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